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T he operations to clear the approaches to Antwerp were among the most important 
actions carried out by the Canadian forces in 
the Second World War yet relatively little is 
known about them. The decision to mount an 
amphibious attack behind German defences in 
the Breskens Pocket was a particularly brilliant 
example of what is now called manoeuvre 
warfare, but neither Lieutenant-Guy Simonds, 
acting commander of First Canadian Army, nor 
CRASC 
3CdnInfDiv 
Sir, 
Hereunder please find my report on BMA 
[Beach Maintenance Area] established from 9 
CDN INF BDE Operation "SWITCHBACK" -
amphibious landing on the SCHELDT Pocket, 
area BIERVLIET, HOLLAND, 9 October 1944. 
As per your instructions, I proceeded to 
WIPPELGEM, BELGIUM, along with three 
ammunition, three petrol and two supply issuers 
to list and to take note of loading of thirty-eight 
Terrapins, which were loaded with the following 
and in priority of landing - Ammunition, Water, 
Sups (como packs), Rum, Blankets, Pot and 
Flame Throwing Fluid, making a total of 152 
tons. Terrapins were completely loaded by 1500 
hours, 7 October 1944 and we then proceeded 
to join 9 CDN INF BDE HQ where we were 
briefed. Captain McLellan joined us. Our job was 
to proceed across the SAVOJAARDS PLAAT, a 
stretch of water approximately four kilometres 
distance, land on GREEN BEACH (sq 1914), 
recce a petrol, ammunition and supply dump 
which was to be called a Beach Maintenance 
Area, from which units could draw readily all 
desirable commodities. D-Day was October 9th, 
H-Hour was approximately 0130 hours from two 
Major-General Dan Spry, General Officer 
Commanding 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, 
have been given much credit for the exploit. 
One of the many aspects of Operation 
"Switchback" deserving of study is the logistical 
problems of the operation. This contemporary 
report prepared from 3rd Division's CRASC 
(Commander, Royal Army Service Corps) 
describes one aspect of the work of the Royal 
Canadian Army Service Corps. - Editor 
assaulting battalions. We were to go across in 
the morning, but since the beachhead was so 
small at that time we were unable to land until 
2100 hours that evening, being transported by 
two buffaloes (LVT), each carrying one jeep. A 
point of interest here arises in that the beach 
was being heavily shel led from several 
directions, the guiding lights on the beach had 
been destroyed and consequently we were not 
landed in the correct spot. The rest of that night 
we spent on the beach in slit trenches. Captain 
McLellan's jeep was unfortunately destroyed by 
a shell. We contacted 9 BDE HQ and the next 
day made a recce along with BRASCO 9 BDE. 
Instead of selecting three different dumps for 
ammunition, supply and petrol, it was decided 
to establish one dump to hold all commodities. 
This proved a wise decision as all anticipated 
locations were shelled within the next four or 
five days, which no doubt would have been 
unfortunate had we been there. That evening 
(October 10th), the 38 Terrapins arrived, which 
we unloaded in the dark, completing this around 
midnight. Thirty-six loaders had been provided 
by 9 BDE as part of the BMA staff. 
Captain T.R. MacDonald had arrived that day 
also, along with 11 jeeps and trailers. Their job 
was to haul ammunition from the beach, when 
transported over by Buffaloes, because the 
Buffaloes, unlike the Terrapins, could not leave 
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the beach on account of the harm done to their 
tracks by the hard roads. They off-loaded onto 
the beach and the jeep platoon with their trailers 
hau led to the BMA. These worked very 
satisfactorily from time to time. They were also 
to establish forward ammunition, petrol or 
supply points should the tactical situation arise. 
This never happened. 
On 11 October, the DAQMG [Deputy Adjutant 
and Quartermaster General] visited us and was 
apparently quite satisfied. On the night of 
October 11 and during the day of October 12, 
8 CDN INF BDE came in to enlarge the dump. 
8 BDE provided one officer, Captain Bourassa 
and 30 men. Captain Bourassa was made Camp 
Commander on the BMA. Also, we received two 
more ammunition, supply and petrol issuers. 
Units would come in by troops, squadrons, 
companies and even platoons, to draw their 
requirements. We supplied them. Replenishment 
was controlled by Division from the other side. 
A State was sent them twice daily and Terrapins 
arrived once daily with requirements as stocks 
got low. The Terrapins did an excellent job and 
are ideal for maintaining such a dump. They 
loaded from RCASC dumps on the other side. 
We carried in the BMA at its maximum, 
NAC PA 131249 Two Buffaloes, loaded with troops and supplies, leave Neuzen for the Canadian bridgehead, 11 October 1944. 
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Top: Canadian wounded being unloaded from a Terrapin 
amphibious vehicle at a Scheldt Pocket embarkation point west 
of Terneuzen, Netherlands, 13 October 1944. 
Middle: German prisoners, captured during the Operation 
Switchback, disembark a Buffalo, 13 October 1944. 
Above: A Buffalo making the transition from land to water. 
78 
approximately 240 tons of ammunition, 60 tons 
of petrol, derv, FTF (H) C02 bottles and oil, and 
100 tons of supplies, water, blankets, stretchers 
and signal equipment. 
It is interesting to note that one shell, landing 
in our dump, perforated 12 jerry cans of petrol, 
but did not catch fire. 
We also hand led refugees and some 
prisoners, and feeding of the same. The three 
hundred prisoners did enough work to warrant 
the bully beef, hard tack and water expended 
on them. 
We continued to supply 8 and 9 BDES along 
with supporting troops all their requirements 
until October 18 when all remaining petrol and 
supplies were withdrawn to company lines and 
the ammunition remained there as a forward 
ammunition point under the command of 
Captain E. Manning. 
Lessons to be learned from this operation 
are as follows: 
1. Adequate facilities should be provided 
for refugees in the early stages. In our 
case we took this on because of necessity. 
We handled 150 people, young and old, 
overnight as shipping space was not 
available. 
2. A Prisoner of War cage, together with 
proper staff, should be set up in early 
stages. 
3. An Ordnance Officer with small staff 
should be located in the BMA, to handle 
mainly signal equipment. 
4. Wireless communications should be 
available between BMA and those 
controlling the replenishment of the BMA 
for urgent needs.... 
Field 
25 October 1944 
signed 
A. J.S. Turvey, Captain 
HQ RCASC 3 CDN INF DIV 
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